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ABSTRACT: The article addresses significant aspects of the constitution of the European Union’s social 
basis from the broader perspective of a European space under construction. The specific point of view 
regards the process of Europeanization through enlargement to the post-socialist Eastern and South Eu-
ropean countries, and conditionality as its main instrument. In the light of the five-year moratorium pro-
posed by the Juncker Commission in 2015, the process is examined particularly from its margins by con-
sidering the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), i.e. the last country in the ‘Western Balkans’, together 
with Kosovo, that is not yet a candidate for EU membership. The analysis aims to shed light on two dif-
ferent and conflictual forms of agency: first, the institution building process through accession proce-
dures; second, social dissent patterns and citizens’ mobilization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The purpose 
is to analyze if and how these diverse agencies cross borders and soften boundaries to constitute an 
emerging European society. A constant methodological concern of this study is if and how an ethnogra-
phy of the process may contribute to the analysis of European integration in its complex, non-linear and 
often contradictory nature (Kauppi 2013). 
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1. Introduction 
 The European Union as an imagined community developed through the process of 
gradual integration and enlargement of the European nation states and citizens (Delanty 
1995). The institutionalization of the European Union in its ‘deepening’ dimension, as a 
project of common citizenship, much more than in its ‘widening’ dimension as a supra-
national organization in expansion, has been based on a specific capacity of its protago-
nists to revolutionize given cognitive patterns using social imagination (Inglehardt 1970, 
Scartezzini 2009). This capacity has been indispensable, but also insufficient, for the cre-
ation of new models of social solidarity, and thus of an alternative political and cultural 
(re)production and redistribution of material, symbolic and power resources among 
peers (Barbier and Colomb 2014; Ferrero 2004, 2005; Fraser 2013). In this sense, acqui-
sition of and participation in the new European citizenship today may be seen as an ex-
tremely difficult and manifold challenge.  
 From the perspective of principles, the EU is structured as transversal and transna-
tional – and thus border-crossing – on the basis of a range of shared universal and dem-
ocratic values, and it is open to negotiation on other values that are culturally, histori-
cally and scientifically questioned. From the point of view of policies and practices, alt-
hough the current transitional European elites are strongly nation-biased, they have to 
deal with an agenda of pressing common issues, such as the economic and financial cri-
sis; Euroskepticism (de Wilde, Michailidou and Trenz 2013), but also the indifference of 
a huge number of (Western) European citizens towards EU integration (Van Ingelgom 
2014); social protests against austerity policies (and not only) throughout the member 
countries (della Porta and Mattoni 2014); the migrant ‘question’ (Favell 2014) and refu-
gee crisis between the ‘open city’ (Sassen 2014) and ‘fortress’ model of Europe (Zielonka 
2006); violent conflicts in its liminal zones of the aspirant states – from Turkey to 
Ukraine; and terrorism.  
 When the European identity is discussed, this new (utopian?) kind of a common and 
transnational citizenship in terms of belonging – the intimate cosmopolitanism of Europe 
(Beck 2012) – refers not only to the nation-state citizens of the member countries, and 
migrants as denizens, with differentiated status of residence, of its wide territory. It also 
becomes a desirable aim for many citizens of the aspirant countries, one able to mobilize 
huge social energies, as in the case of the EuroMaidan square in Kiev. This article begins 
by asking if and how the EU membership negotiation process concretely achieves em-
powerment of the democratic institutions of these countries through the political, social 
and economic emancipation of their citizens.  
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 It seems that what is effectively happening remains at the level of the bureaucratic 
procedural dimension of Europeanization as a mere normative ‘harmonization’ of the 
aspirant nation state’s legislation with the 35 chapters of the Acquis. The ‘enlargement 
fatigue’, after the block integration of ‘ten plus two’ post-socialist countries in 2004 and 
2007, followed by the silent entrance of Croatia in 2013, ended with a five-year morato-
rium imposed by the Juncker Commission. If the main criteria for membership have not 
yet been met by so many candidate and potential candidate states, as was confirmed by 
Progress Reports of the European Commission for 2015, one of the reasons is the pre-
dominant type of EU governance. The democratic deficit of the EU then clashes with the 
deeper democratic deficit of these societies (Western Balkans countries and Turkey), 
with unpredictable consequences.  
 The common feature of the broader European space – including neighboring countries 
that aspire to EU membership – is a growing critical mass of ‘hopeless and helpless’, 
under-represented and voiceless ‘residual’ social groups and categories: unemployed 
and precarious workers; young people; poor children, elderly persons and women; mi-
norities; the ill and disabled; refugees and asylum seekers; ‘clandestine’ and regular im-
migrants. This situation undermines the core principles of an inclusive European democ-
racy unable (and sometimes unwilling) to include them as political subjects without the 
support of a new transnational welfare project. These emerging forms of social conflict, 
based on new, not yet recognizable social cleavages, are generating waves of protest 
throughout the European space. Monitoring and analysing their subterranean magmatic 
flow, with intermittent violent eruptions, may be one of the major challenges for inter-
disciplinary scientific research.  
 It is not the intention of this article to provide answers to all the questions raised in 
the introduction. In what follows I will try to shed light on some important dimensions 
of the transnationalisation of the European societies, both within the institutions and 
outside them. The first section of the article will problematize the notion of a ‘European 
society’ and the process of constructing a new European citizenship as highly controver-
sial. The second section will address the idea of citizenship constructed in practice by 
exploring ‘troubles and issues’ that have been emerging for a European transnational 
society through the enlargement/accession process. The analysis will adopt a twofold 
perspective on the negotiating character of the institutional framework of this process, 
and of the methodological problem of how to explore forms of agency of actors directly 
involved in it.  
 The ‘enlargement fatigue’ since 2007 and the current five-year moratorium point to 
the intrinsic institutional and structural deficiency of EU governance, accused of double 
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standards and criteria, or of having a ‘Janus-faced’ nature where “one face promises op-
portunities, the other poses threat”, as Barbier and Colomb put it (Barbier and Colomb 
2014). In this sense, the ‘Western Balkan’ countries frame a specific European space-set 
for analysis of this kind because the current stagnation, and the slow and inefficient pro-
gress of the negotiations, reopen the spectrum of new conflicts. Thus, the paradigmatic 
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, significant as a European ‘black hole’, will be examined 
in the third section, considering, among other dimensions, recent mobilization and civic 
protests of its citizens as part of a global and European waves of protest in 2013 and 
2014. Focusing on this specific case may yield better understanding of the weight and 
importance of every single act or decision in the current watershed situation of the Eu-
ropean integration process. 
 There is still no valid empirical evidence on the relationship between these protests, 
in Bosnia and other ‘Western Balkan’ countries, or in Turkey1 and Ukraine, and the shift 
of EU politics towards further enlargement after the announcement of a five-year mor-
atorium in January 2015. However, an attempt to determine essential features of social 
and political claims arising from the atonal clamour of a multitude of these interpretative 
subjectivities, regarding both norms and practices, with potential unattended conse-
quences, may be considered another important approach to the question of a new Eu-
ropean citizenship, if any (Favell and Giraudon 2011). 
 
 
2. Is there any such thing as a European society? 
 
 More than anything else, the year 1989 opened a horizon of hope for the citizens of 
Central and Eastern Europe.2 Nowadays, the democratic and liberal transformation of 
those societies – aspired to as a project for an immediate better future, constructed day-
by-day, and no longer a utopian fallacy to which everyday life must be sacrificed – is 
proving much more arduous than was imaginable at the beginning. 
 The two Europes, West and East, are now strongly united in the crisis of a ‘European 
democratic model’ and its ability to produce and distribute wealth for its citizens and, at 
the same time, safeguard the ideal of social justice (Delanty 2014). The deep-lying rea-
sons for this crisis are too easily dismissed by governments (right-wing and left-wing) or 
 
1 Actual refugee crisis and the controversial March 2016 agreement between EU and Turkey, in which the 
re-opening of the negotiations of the accession process was one of the main conditions imposed by Turkish 
President Erdogan, opened a new chapter in this story that should be carefully observed. 
2 As Adam Michnik wrote in an article for the twentieth anniversary of the ‘velvet revolution’, it was an 
‘Annus mirabilis’ (Michnik 2009). 
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by the EU elites, and the new (neoliberal) policy choices seek legitimacy as the indispen-
sable and inevitable means to meet the challenges of globalization, thereby gradually 
reducing many important achievements by Western democracy in the twentieth cen-
tury. The main outcome, with long-term damaging consequences, concerns the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of people embraced by national state and EU citizen-
ship, and the institution of the social state in Europe’s labour-based societies. 
 The new democracies have proved even more vulnerable as the socialist welfare state 
has been dismantled and scrapped as a remnant of the communist regime, leaving its 
citizens without a minimum of social security (Offe 1994, 1997), and exposed to the im-
pact of a kind of Marxian primitive accumulation of capital without real control by the 
weak democratic institutions of the new states: a kind of ‘rebuilding a ship at a stormy 
sea’ (Elster et al. 1998). Consequently, the ‘future’ as a real and realistic project of social 
action, of ‘acting in concert’ (Arendt 1958), seems to have become increasingly opaque 
and illegible. 
 Western European political, journalistic and even sociological discourse on the ‘future’ 
involves another social category that has become opaque: young people as without a 
future, or deprived of a future. More than a real concern for the younger generation, 
this discourse reveals a profound inability of political elites and intellectuals in Europe, 
and more in general of European civil society (or societies), to meet the new social chal-
lenges and to transcend outdated patterns of conceiving and governing the (nation-
state) common space still based on the presumption of (ethnic, national, religious, cul-
tural) separation and confinement. Thernborn spoke of the current European crisis in 
terms of the devastation, among other things, of a “large portion of the youth cohort (…) 
outside education, training and employment”, especially in the Southern and Eastern 
European countries (Therborn 2014: 477).3 As a consequence, the ‘outraged young’ have 
become a major social force of resistance through the civic protests that have erupted 
in recent years around the globe, in some cases producing violent conflicts and even war, 
as in the Arab Mashrek and the Middle East (Hessel 2010, 2011; Sloam 2014; Kaldor and 
Selchow 2013). The global wave of protests has had a particular impact in the EU coun-
tries most affected by the crisis, like Greece and Spain, but also in a number of aspirant 
countries like Turkey, Ukraine, and in the ‘Western Balkans’. 
 However, a profound social discontent, flowing as a slow and steady underground 
process since the late 1980s, has brought to light new social cleavages in European soci-
eties, mixing Western and Eastern patterns of social inequality. The new movements, 
 
3 Thernborn also referred to Ireland as one of the “Southern victims of the Anglo-Saxon financial crisis” 
(Therborn 2014). 
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not yet socially definable, seem to be the major indicators of the ongoing transfor-
mation. The main players of these spreading protests, characterized by their transna-
tional mobilization and symbolism (della Porta and Mattoni 2014), consist of newly pau-
perized, socially indeterminate middle classes, ‘crucially including students’ (Thernborn 
2014: 10); and in some cases, particularly the post-communist countries, of a completely 
disempowered working class, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina or in Croatia. 
 Apparent in this complex situation, without a clear horizon of either an imminent fu-
ture or a distant one, is the weakness of a supra and transnational Europe in terms of its 
democratic deficit, and the crisis (economic, financial, political and social) of the Euro-
pean project. (Beck 2012; Habermas 2012, 2015; Outhwaite 2014) 
 The European Union is today composed of 28 national states, while eight others are 
closely and institutionally related to it as candidate countries with different statuses of 
negotiation – ranging from the frozen status of Iceland, through that of Turkey and 
FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania, which have been undergoing the process of 
harmonization with the Acquis communautaire, to the potential candidate status of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina and the special status of Kosovo and the Turkish-Cypriot Commu-
nity. Whilst these formal procedures of ‘enlargement’ towards ‘accession’ may be ob-
served and investigated with more traditional methods of analysis, because they are 
fairly transparent and well defined considering the institutions and norms, roles and re-
sponsibilities of the actors involved, and more linear and predictable in regard to the 
flow of actions, the complementary processes of ‘integration’ versus ‘Europeanization’ 
are less visible (if not opaque), resistant to definition, fluid and unpredictable in their 
interconnectedness. The organizational and institutional structure of the EU, or the way 
it operates at different levels, may be criticized, even fiercely, because the object of such 
criticism is a concrete set of problems: the EU’s financial and monetary austerity policies, 
for example, or its weak foreign policies. This is not the case if integration and Europe-
anization are considered: in these cases we, as social scientists, must deal with truly pro-
found societal changes correlated to the emergence of a new historical epoch, not only 
post-modern, but beyond modernity, yet rooted in the aftermath of the modern organ-
ization of social life. Because Europe is a locus of multiple contradictory transformations, 
Europeanization may be seen as a reframing, re-domaining and recoupling process 
(Rumford 2014) that requires a complex, dynamic and troubled translation (Balibar 
2010).  
 Integration as Europeanization cannot be observed directly, and requires serious 
methodological consideration. Exploring Europeanization as just ‘harmonization’ with a 
set of (Western) values, principles, norms and forms of representation (Scartezzini 2009) 
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is not only a complex but also disputable aim; above all, it is not enough. All these ele-
ments are constantly re-configured within the dynamics between the ‘European sphere’ 
– defined in terms of the EU’s geopolitical and economic interests and influences – and 
a ‘European space’ which frames a flow of interaction and communication among its 
different parts, conflictual but open to mutual understanding and the creation of mean-
ing, which builds new forms of belonging and solidarity, and which potentially embraces 
both its actual and future citizens. 
 If the ‘harmonization’ is related to the Copenhagen principles as such, it is not difficult 
to achieve a discursive consensus on them among collective and individual social actors 
throughout the European space. But whether the political and social experience of citi-
zens is really based on and gives life to those principles, in day-to-day interactions and 
practices, is another question.  
 The Europeanization process is not uni-directional and linear. Although it is sometimes 
simplified into a mere transfer of achievements already accomplished in the core EU 
states, this simply does not correspond to the reality. European societies are at present 
highly turbulent, and the idea of harmonization as such does not convey the complexity 
of different aspects of Europeanization inside the EU, in terms of ‘deepening’, not con-
sidering its ‘widening’ dimension (Wallace 1993). 
 Hence the question of whether there is any such thing as a European society proves 
to be also a conceptual and methodological one, as the critique of methodological na-
tionalism has partly demonstrated (Beck and Grande 2006; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 
2002). The modern theory of society was nationally framed, from the political philosophy 
of the Enlightenment to the theories of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel and other clas-
sics of sociology and of political and social theory, as an essentially modern science which 
built its concepts and categories to describe, comprehend and interpret the new social 
reality of the past two centuries. Yet the notion of nation, related to the state, remains 
the central tool with which to explain European society defined as: a. the sum of the 
national state societies of its members, and, conditionally, of the aspirant states’ socie-
ties; b. exclusive supra-national society of the EU (from 6 to 28); c. inclusive trans-na-
tional society of Europe in terms of the cosmopolitan Europe as described in Beck and 
Grande (2006) or in Rumford (2008).  
 Thus the notion of European integration through enlargement and accession assumes 
different meanings: becoming a EU member state means also being part of EU society, 
and a constitutive element of a transnational European society. In its more visible di-
mension, integration may be seen as a process of gradually redefining the borders and 
boundaries among states and nations through formal and informal normative and pro-
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cedural redefinition of the barriers to full citizenship, but also as participation and em-
powerment – citizenship constructed in practice – blurring the boundaries between po-
litical and social citizenship (Bifulco 2015). Although it does not exhaust all dimensions 
of the process, the gradual redefinition and acquisition of social (in its enabling dimen-
sion) and civic citizenship (as participation in a political life in the European public space), 
through the process of negotiation that precedes full membership, is a core element of 
integration. Time is its fundamental structural component, because multiple constituent 
elements and dimensions of citizenship must be discussed during the accession process:  
rights, obligations and liberties, but also belonging and identity. Others must be con-
structed, acquired and even learned, because the political, social and civic empower-
ment supported by access to the EU’s resources passes through the acquisition and 
building of a new patterns of democratic participation, and it needs to be embodied in 
new social, cultural and political practices. The complementary spatial dimension of this 
constant questioning and discussion regards the public space not only of the aspirant 
countries but also of the actual member ones (Bauböck 2010; Bee and Scartezzini 2009; 
Fossum 2009; Soysal 2001). 
 These growing social and civic rights, obligations and liberties of the candidate (and 
potential candidate) countries’ citizens, as limited forms of EU citizenship, still enable 
them to participate in the political dimension of opinion formation (Urbinati 2014). The 
aspiration to become part of the EU may act as a powerful incentive in regard to political 
and economic, social and civic capabilities (Appadurai 2011; Bifulco 2015; De Leonardis 
2011; Sen 1999).  
 Finally, despite the profound crisis of the EU, and the objections to both its legitimacy 
and its capability to deal with the numerous challenges analyzed before, it seems that a 
‘European society’ emerges slowly and turbulently, through the process of reframing the 
resistant Europe of the Nations. The condition of democratization through Europeaniza-
tion, imposed by the EU to the aspirant, periphery and marginal countries, turns out to 
be coercive for the EU as such, as no integration is possible without deep core transfor-
mations.  
 In the next section I will analyse the effects of new conditions to the enlargement 
imposed by the five-year moratorium trying to imagine its possible unattended conse-
quences, both for the accession countries and for the EU.  
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3. The conditionality of the accession and the moratorium to the enlargement 
 
 The elections of the new European leadership in 2014 were held in a situation of a 
deep economic and financial crisis of the EU. The tension among its member states and 
its supranational institutions continues to undermine the democratic structure of the 
EU’s governance, dominated by the neoliberal and neo-functionalist approaches. Popu-
lism and other forms of anti-politics have entered the political arena throughout Europe, 
generating negative effects at the EU level. Another threat to democracy – knowledge-
based government by technocrats as an ‘epistemic’ response to the crisis (Urbinati 2014) 
– continues to be proposed as a solution. Growing economic and social inequalities, the 
increased social polarization, and the decreased efficiency of social justice mechanisms 
that have characterized post-communist transitional societies from 1989 on, are now 
shared with many European countries, in particular with the Mediterranean ones, with-
out a strong alternative political option in opposition to the neoliberal one. Furthermore, 
a specific model of identity conflicts, based on claims to the right to self-determination, 
has been radicalized in recent years as another indicator of the current tension between 
state and nation even in core European states like the UK or Spain. 
 Anyhow, important goals were accomplished during the five-year mandate of the sec-
ond Barroso Commission: Croatia became the 28th member of the EU (July 2013), while 
Montenegro (December 2010), Serbia (March 2013) and Albania (June 2014) acquired 
the status of candidate countries, and Kosovo a special status (2013). Yet, the member-
ships of Turkey (candidate since 1999), FYRO Macedonia (candidate since 2005), and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (potential candidate since 2005) are still at stake, and turbulent 
events in two past years, and the current refugee crisis involving these countries should 
be considered in connection to the EU politics of enlargement.  
 However, this is the first time in the history of the European Union that the leadership 
has imposed a formal five-year moratorium on the enlargement process, although all 
these applicant countries, with the status of either candidate or potential candidate for 
membership, have been undergoing the procedure at different levels. 
 The entire region of the ‘Western Balkans’ remains highly conflictual after its specific 
‘troubles and issues’ exasperated throughout the 1990s. Intrinsically European, it should 
be considered, not just as a group of states involved in a procedure of accession, but also 
as a specific European space-set in its specific supranational and transnational dimen-
sion. The constructiveness of the social reality here finds its evidence, and the process 
of European accession and integration is fundamental for the creation of a range of pos-
sible futures for the citizens and societies of this part of Europe (Petrović 2012). 
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 In the Western Balkans, the European Union is constantly challenged by its own goal 
of democratization and Europeanization of the region’s transitional societies –post-com-
munist, post-Yugoslav and post-conflict–, as a kind of a specular reflection of its own 
‘deepening’ deficit. Sedelmeier discussed this difficulty in terms of the stress of an un-
precedented EU engagement in the ‘adjustment efforts’ of the CEE states, because ‘a 
key novelty in the eastern enlargements’ was that the new candidate countries were in 
the process of post-communist transition and not yet ready to enforce the acquis com-
munautaire (Sedelmeier 2011: 5). 
 Although many goals have been achieved in a number of CEE countries, a large part 
of ‘what remains of the Balkans’, notwithstanding the efforts made by the EU accession 
institutions and programs, still does not fulfil all membership criteria. It is thus legitimate 
to ask why in these cases, including Turkey, the EU device of conditionality as a basic 
component of the accession process has not been effective enough? 
 After several years of ‘enlargement fatigue’, a five-year moratorium may be inter-
preted as a kind of admission of failure in regard to the applicant states, and as an ad-
monishment to the new aspirants. Public opinion in the EU members seems to be indif-
ferent to many other European issues (Van Inglegom 2014), but it is still quite committed 
to the widening perspective. As Hobolt shows in her recent study, a positive attitude 
towards further enlargement has significantly decreased since 2010 in all member 
states; but it is radically low in creditor states of the Eurozone, where citizens, especially 
those with high levels of social and cultural capital, much prefer the deepening dimen-
sion of European integration to the widening one (Hobolt 2014). Many questions arise: 
what will this ‘five-year break from enlargement’ mean for the European integration 
process? What could be its impact on the ‘three strategic benefits of enlargement’: mak-
ing Europe a safer place, improving the quality of people’s lives, making Europeans more 
prosperous? (EC Strategic paper 2014) 
 The problem concerns the risk of ‘removing’ the commitment to the applicant coun-
tries as if the moratorium could (or should) freeze the present political, economic and 
social (bad) conditions of those societies. Botta and Schwellnus have demonstrated that 
the effectiveness of EU conditionality decreases during the accession end-game, when 
the date of accession is fixed, because of a relaxation effect (Botta and Schwellnus 2014: 
5). Other empirical evidence shows that the widening of the EU has had a ‘catalyst effect 
on deepening’ in terms of the paradox of unattended consequences. (Heidbreder 2014) 
What will happen to this effect if the process is put on hold? 
 Some of the main problems relative to the WB societies – ethnic-based nationalism 
and populism; the problem of a democratic representation model able to resolve the 
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tension between nationhood and citizenship; the difficulty of defining the political sub-
ject of sovereignty (state or nation/people), which was fatal for the former Yugoslavia, if 
associated with the principle of the right to self-determination; the inclusion of minority 
groups as equal citizens and the respect of their fundamental human rights –, can all be 
considered as quite similar to the problems regarding the construction of a supranational 
and transnational Europe (Sekulić 2014). It is as if the communicational problem of trans-
lation among these different European space-sets constantly produces a kind of residual 
dimension of Europeanization, both in the EU and the WB countries; something that es-
capes the attention of the actors and institutions involved. Here emerges the methodo-
logical problem of how could we search for a specific evidence and knowledge of these 
processes beyond the analytical dimension of the research? What kind of an ethnogra-
phy of the process may help to grasp better ‘what is hiding beyond the text’? 
 An ethnography of the European integration process is far away from what can be 
simply described as ‘get out on the street and look around’, as it has to deal with diverse 
and multiple problems (Vidali 2013), regarding a multitude of different sites (Burawoy 
et al. 2000; Hannerz 2003). At the same time it has to be a methodology “able to reveal 
the effective practices of the social actors in their social, professional and day-by-day 
contexts” (Dal Lago, De Biasi 2004: p. VIII), making institutions ethnographically accessi-
ble (Smith 2005). 
 
 
3.1 Participation through institution building process 
  
 The process of enlargement in general and, in our case, regarding the Western Balkan 
states, is put in act through the network created among institutions and actors that have 
been concretely dealing with the association procedure: those with seats in Brussels (Di-
rectorate General for the Enlargement of the EC and the Missions and Embassies of the 
WB countries) and in capitals of the WB countries (state institutions as parliament and 
government; Delegation of the EU to the applicant country; NGOs, selected groups of 
intellectuals). Although this network constantly grows in its extent – especially for the 
countries that are more successful in fulfilling various conditions and passing through 
the stages of integration, the effective group of people connected in the network re-
mains circumscribed. The dynamics of communication within this network(s) emerged 
to be quite similar in different cases explored, and strongly related to the personal ability 
and affinity among concrete actors. The institutional involvement of civil society through 
the NGO sector, and in some cases other civic actors like trade union or religious com-
munity representatives in periodic consultations with governmental and parliamentary 
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institutions in these countries, still seems insufficient to involve citizenry in a public de-
bate on European integration. Strained scientific capacities of the academic and research 
communities in these countries, hit by a severe structural deficit of resources for a long 
period of transition, and therefore non-competitive at international level, produces lim-
ited knowledge about the respective society. The access to the European funds preva-
lently regarded for a long time asymmetrical Tempus projects based on the transfer of 
knowledge (from West to East), instead of common research projects with equal oppor-
tunities of participation (Sekulić 2011). The Eurobarometer progressively included sta-
tistics on in-coming candidate countries, yet no standardized comparative information 
about these countries was available for many years. 
 Thus, exploring the internal institutional dynamics within these networks involved in 
the accession process remains partial, as it seems not yet able to involve huge segments 
of societies. The substantial stagnation of the process, notwithstanding several positive 
advances in the cases of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania, seems to be one of 
the causes behind growing social dissent in the Western Balkans, and in Turkey, some-
times with nationalistic and populist features, bringing these countries closer to the EU 
in a paradoxical way4. 
 An analysis of a new patterns of mobilization by citizens in the condition of political 
and social crises, inside and outside the EU, and the looming menace of violence, can 
perhaps shed light on the residual zones of the process of integration, in both its political 
and social dimensions. From Spain and Greece5, Bosnia and Turkey, to Ukraine, these 
protests highlight a certain shift of social cleavages increasingly expressed in claims for 
a new social justice, and acting as a ‘challenge of the existing political hierarchies and 
values’ (Kauppi 2013: 6). Consequently, a new question arises: what systems of meaning 
do these movements produce? Can they be interpreted as an effect of Europeanization 
of the European space-sets? (Recchi and Kuhn 2013; Heidbreder 2014) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
4 The current refugee crisis that strongly involved Western Balkans and Turkey cannot be tackled here, as it 
brings two many open questions regarding the EU integration.  
5 These social movements had a strong impact on recent elections in Greece and Spain, with Syriza winning 
the political elections, and Podemos winning first the administrative elections in Madrid and Barcelona, and 
then being one of the major political parties involved in the government formation in 2015/2016. The elec-
tion results in Turkey (June 2015) seem again to reveal the direct influence of the Taksim Square and Gazi 
Park protests. 
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3.2 Constituting the European society from below: outrage, street protests, flare-ups, 
insurrections as forms of active citizenship 
 
The mobilization of citizens in many European and non-European countries against 
growing social inequality, destruction of the welfare state(s), the increasing rate of un-
employment and new forms of discriminatory employment, especially among young 
people, defines the object of criticism against the neoliberal conception of capitalism 
that resists regularization and destroys the fundamental democratic assumption of the 
equality of citizens.6 The occupation of squares as key public spaces seemed to send a 
message that problems, needs and interests, ‘troubles and issues’, were once again de-
fined in social and class terms, which had enormous significance in the case of ‘Western 
Balkans’ ethnicized societies. The violent response of the authorities, democratic or oth-
erwise, has been the rule in the majority of cases on a global level: Genoa, Puerta del 
Sol, Wall Street, Taksim Square; Tahrir and other space-sets of the ‘Arab revolutions’; 
and in case of a tragic spread of violence and the shift towards ‘ethnic’ and geopolitical 
conflict after months of resistance by (Euro)Maidan civic protestors. The new wave of 
civic indignation and protests in some of the post-communist European countries should 
be analyzed in relation both to the revolutions of 1989, thus regarding contextual forms 
of democratic transition, and to the process of European integration.  
 In light of the foregoing discussion, a draft analysis of a paradigmatic case of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina will be proposed in the following section as highly significant for, and 
complementary to research on the constitution of the European social basis. Two differ-
ent and conflictual forms of participation will be taken in exam: the institution building 
process through accession procedures, and social dissent patterns and citizens’ mobili-
zation in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the purpose being to analyze if and how 
these diverse agencies cross borders and soften boundaries to constitute an emerging 
European society. 
 
 
 
 
6 The current crisis has mobilized many political and intellectual actors in European and non-European coun-
tries, creating an authentic public space in which to discuss diverse elements of a European project within 
the new global constellation: the fundamental principles of the European community as such, patterns and 
steps in its construction and coming-to-reality; the leftist and rightist populist contestation of the EU, as well 
as a re-actualized ‘yearning for the nation-state' (Habermas and Streeck 2013; Pikkety 2014; Glienecker 
group 2013; Martinelli 2013). 
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4. Europeanization from the margins: BiH versus the European Union 
 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina was identified as a potential candidate country for EU mem-
bership in June 2003, and the Stabilization and Association Agreement officially opened 
in Sarajevo in November 2005. However, the SAA was ratified and implemented only in 
June 2015, and the application for membership was submitted in February 2016, despite 
several negative considerations of the European Commission’s last Progress Report (No-
vember 2015).  
 The trustworthiness and accountability of the political leadership in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina have long been the subject of constant criticism by domestic intellectuals and 
media, European and international institutions, but with no concrete solution. The struc-
tural model of government imposed by the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 – two eth-
nonationally defined entities: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina composed of 10 
cantons, Republic of Srpska, and the autonomous Brčko District – is embodied in the 
collective ‘three-headed’ presidency accompanied by a ‘zero instance’ of the High Rep-
resentative of the ‘International Community’ and the EU Special Representative, with 
the right of interference and veto. This power structure constantly blurs the real holder 
of political responsibility towards the citizenry. The coexistence of multiple, hierarchical 
instances of authority continuously produces a situation in which the political holders of 
the mandate on all levels of the government, state, entity or local, can afford to indulge 
in a kind of ‘infantile’ behavior, testing the limits of patience of the ‘international com-
munity’ or the EU, on the one hand, while taking subjection of their ethnonational elec-
toral bodies for granted, on the other.  
 The society of this country appears trapped between the counter-narratives of recent 
war history in the 1990s, unable to draw new arguments with which to restore a new 
joint project of the state that would make sense for the new generations. Citizens of the 
country have not even had the chance to express what model of state they would like to 
have, both in terms of their (ethno)national collective identity, and, especially, in terms 
of their individual freedoms and rights regarding political, cultural and social citizenship. 
In fact, the Constitution was written in 1995 as the Annex IV to the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment, according to which a significant part of the new state-level political institutions, 
the Presidency and the House of Peoples, excludes those citizens who do not define 
themselves as Serbs, Croats or Bosniaks, the only three groupings recognized as  ‘con-
stituent nations’ (Sekulić 2014). 
 Notwithstanding a number of significant problems in the country, the deadlock of the 
accession process, which lasted from 2009 to 2015, was formally caused by the sentence 
of the European Court for Human Rights in the case of “Dervo Sejdić and Jakob Finci v. 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in June 2009. The ruling of the ECHR followed the complaint 
of two Bosnian citizens who, as members of ‘national minorities’, Roma and Jewish re-
spectively, could not stand for election to the Presidency and to the House of Peoples. 
The Court found in favor of the plaintiffs because their case was recognized as violating 
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The ruling obliged the state to 
supplement the law to comply with European legislation, and at the same time obliged 
the EU bodies and representatives to bind the next steps and decisions regarding the 
pre-association process of the country to the judgement. Yet the sentence could not 
have been implemented without a substantial change of the Constitution which strongly 
affected the precarious equilibrium among the political (ethnonational) leaders of the 
country.  
 The EU institutions applied strong pressure on the counterpart, through initiatives of 
the Directorate General of the EC for Enlargement and the Delegation of the EU in BiH, 
supported by the Office of the High Representative, in order to force state institutions 
and party leaders to open a public discussion about the new Constitution. But the choice 
of the interlocutors in that profoundly complex and delicate discussion was exclusively 
elitarian – among EU/EC officials and representatives, on the one hand, and the political 
leaders on the other. The last Sarajevo initiative in February 2014 partially included rep-
resentatives of civil society, as a demonstrative act of the EC, but with quite limited ef-
fects.7 The negotiations remained out of the public sphere, however, and have not yet 
produced significant results.  
 At the end of 2014, the European Commission decided to unlock the accession pro-
cess, initiate ‘a new approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina’, and ‘re-sequence the condi-
tionalities’ in its European path, in spite of the failure of the ECHR ruling implementation. 
(Progress Report 2015: 4) This contradictory decision by the new Commission leadership, 
especially in light of the simultaneously proclaimed moratorium on enlargement, may 
be seen, optimistically, as a sign of greater awareness among these specific institutional 
actors regarding the complexity of the context, which requires something other than a 
mere bureaucratic approach.  
 The scant effectiveness and efficiency of the state created by the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment still depends only in part on its model of governance. There are many states in 
which local autonomy is constantly improved, and where a sovereign competence on res 
 
7 Stefan Füle, at the time Head of Directorate General for the Enlargement, expressed his concern about the 
negotiations in these words: “Implementation of this judgment is not a remote or virtual issue. It is an inter-
national obligation of Bosnia and Herzegovina that, following the will of the Member States, is now a key to 
progress on the EU path. It has real consequences.”  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-117_en.htm 
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publica and a public good is negotiated, defined and distributed on each of these levels. 
In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the main problem is not just the governance 
and administration of the territory and of the citizens. What is missing is public discus-
sion and deliberation of a civic, democratic and state identity, beyond the ethnonational 
discourse: the same reflection that regards the democratic deficit of the European Un-
ion.  
 The waves of mobilization of the citizenry in 2013 and 2014 were seen by many as the 
first significant breaches of that discourse. 
 
 
4.1 Crossing ethnic borders: transnational mobilization of citizens in BiH 
 
 The triggering event for the widespread social protest and civil disobedience started 
on 5 June 2013 in Sarajevo’s Parliament Square. It concerned the case of a three-month 
old baby, Belmina, one of more than three thousand new-borns in Bosnia and Herze-
govina to whom, from February to June 2013 no personal ID number (JMBG) – and thus 
no formal citizenship – was assigned. Belmina needed medical treatment abroad but 
could not leave the country without a passport. The previous law regulating the assign-
ment of ID numbers had expired in February 2013, and the new one was still being dis-
cussed in the State Parliament: as a consequence, those children were actually stateless, 
and thus rightless (Arendt 1958).  
 This first wave of civic protest lasted several months, although the peak of participa-
tion was reached in the first weeks of June when about 15 thousand people in both en-
tities were involved across ethnic lines. The protests were carried out by the young adult, 
middle class urban cohorts. The State Government (the Council of Ministers) was forced 
to apply a temporary ruling and the babies were registered, while the law was enacted 
in the autumn of the same year. The main result of the first wave of protests was that 
“the malfunctioning of the ethnonationalist system happened” (Mujkić 2014). 
 The second wave of protests started on 4 February 2014 in Tuzla, and it immediately 
spread to the other cities of the Federation (Sarajevo, Zenica, Mostar, Tešanj), Republic 
of Srpska (Banja Luka) and the Brčko district. The difference with respect to the protests 
of June 2013 was evident, because this time the main players in the outburst were des-
perate social groups and categories, some of which used violence against material and 
human symbols of power – governmental buildings and the police – rather than ‘ac-
ceptable’ forms of civil disobedience. Buildings representative of a corrupt power were 
burned: the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina; cantonal buildings in Tuzla, Sarajevo, 
Zenica, Mostar; several municipal seats; ethnonational party headquarters in Mostar. 
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 The phase of direct violence lasted for a few days. Burned buildings and blocked 
streets had a particularly upsetting impact on public opinion in a country still dealing 
with the horrific legacy of the war in the 1990s, particularly in the case of Sarajevo and 
Mostar, cities that had experienced sieges. Many contrasting interpretations immedi-
ately emerged. On the one hand, they sought to explain the violence in ethnonational 
terms, given that conspiracy theories seem to be privileged means to make sense of 
events in this part of the world. On the other hand, the events were seen as a positive 
and hopeful awakening of citizens no longer willing to submit to the coercion of a totally 
alienated political power (Buden 2014; Kazaz, Papić and Dmitrović 2014; Štiks 2014). 
Most comments and analyses of these events agree on two characteristics of the pro-
tests, both expressed in Žižek’s words on their deep-lying cause: a radical demand for 
justice, and rebellion against nationalist elites (Žižek 2014). Živanović, a philosopher from 
Banja Luka, emphasized the question of human dignity and humiliation considered as 
the common feature of the actual condition of a huge number of Bosnians and Herze-
govinians (Živanović 2014).  
The ‘collective effervescence’ of the protests, maintained through the institution of 
a permanent assembly of citizens (Plenum), began to subside during and after the envi-
ronmental catastrophe provoked by the floods that hit the Western Balkans, and in par-
ticular Bosnia and Serbia, at the beginning of May 2014. Border-crossing solidarity 
among people who helped each other across the territory of the state, and through the 
former Yugoslav space, evoked other times of ‘brotherhood and unity’, and reinforced 
the impression that a strong social cleavage based on ethnonational identity, imposed 
by instrumental violence during the war in the 1990s, had started to lose its strength.  
 However, the reasons for the rather modest outcomes of the uprising (a few cantonal 
governments resigned), should be explored much more closely than is possible here. A 
few hypotheses may be put forward. First, Bosnian-Herzegovinian society as a transi-
tional democracy is still characterized by a weak civil society, organized mostly through 
the NGO sector, with all the negative aspects that this can entail. There is a lack of alter-
native channels for civic action and active citizenship, and the administrative barriers 
between entities or among cantons of the Federation – such as separate Ministries of 
Culture and Education at all levels, or the absence of public transport between Sarajevo 
and East Sarajevo – continue to hinder the creation of stronger ties between new cohorts 
institutionally divided by their supposed ethnonational belongings. Second, the specific 
transition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and of the entire former Yugoslav space through-
out the wars (1991-1999), did not help at all in the construction of a political democratic 
culture of citizens.  
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 The uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not have sufficient force to become a 
movement, to acquire its political quality (Arendt 1990). On the contrary, the organizers 
of and participants in the plenums and forums continued to repeat that their intention 
was not a political one, that no existing political party was welcome to the sessions, and 
that their goal was not to constitute themselves as a party. Third, the outbreaks of June 
2013 and of February 2014 arose from different parts of Bosnian society: the first group, 
which seemed in a certain sense better equipped for political action (and at the same 
time less motivated), did not give clear support to the second one, for reasons yet to be 
explored. The February movement lacked a capable leadership, which in part diminished 
the authority of its representatives who had to deal with the authorities. Finally, and for 
our purpose most importantly, the indecision of the EU in many respects regarding Bos-
nia and Herzegovina’s ‘troubled’ society was evident once again. No effective measures 
were taken to apply pressure on the local elites, to combat corruption, to support pro-
gressive social partners substantially. The strongest reaction of the EU politicians during 
the protests, in the year of the political elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina held in Oc-
tober 2014, was expressed in one of the chapters of the European “Council conclusions 
on Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Luxemburg 14 April 2014): 
The Council heard the public protests and calls by BiH citizens to improve the social and eco-
nomic situation in the country. All BiH citizens, including the younger generation, need to be 
given new opportunities. It strongly urges the BiH institutions and elected leaders to reach out 
to the people, engage with civil society and provide responsible and immediate answers to 
their legitimate concerns. The Council emphasizes that it is the collective responsibility of all 
BiH political leaders. Ahead of the general elections in October 2014, more needs to be done, 
not less. (European Council 2014) 
 These protests, not yet articulated as movements, caused by the social despair of cit-
izens, have begun to create in this country a new public sphere, with its double meaning 
of being transnational – locally and globally – and to define the needs and interests of 
individuals and groups on grounds other than those that led to the destruction of the 
previous society. The citizens involved in these protests break through the barrier of so-
cial and political indifference and apathy, contesting the ethnonational discourse and 
practice in which partition, as basically territorial and related to the redefinition of bor-
ders, is deeply embedded in the European national state tradition, as a privileged solu-
tion for political and social conflicts.  
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5. Summary 
 
 In this article I have considered the constitution of a social basis of the European Union 
from the broader perspective of a European space, in which the citizens of the applicant 
countries are taken into account as members of the same society with limited, but also 
growing rights, obligations and liberties. The problem of democratization through Euro-
peanization was tackled in the first two sections, as crucial for the construction of a new 
democratic European society. In its more visible dimension, as the process of integration 
through enlargement and association procedures, it was approached by the analysis of 
the conditionality as a main instrument of the institution building process in aspirant 
countries, with a particular concern to the empowerment of civil society actors. The re-
sidual social space, not less important for these transformative processes, in which the 
new wave of citizens’ mobilization has come about in the past few years, was also briefly 
investigated as constitutive for the new European public space.  
 The paradigmatic case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the only Western Balkan coun-
try, together with Kosovo, which has not fulfilled the criteria for the status of a candidate 
country, was considered in the final part of the article. The political and social conditions 
of this country, and the dynamics of its relations at regional (former Yugoslav space) and 
European level points to a number of significant questions concerning the process of the 
EU’s deepening versus widening, were a number of ‘troubles and issues’ seems to be 
shared by BiH and EU. 
 The image of a ‘black hole’ that can be traced in informal expressions by European 
officials when referring to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Balkans in general, assumes 
multiple meanings here. In physics, the danger of black holes is their enormous concen-
tration of negative energy able to attract and absorb space bodies which enter their 
range. The lack of a ‘credible accession perspective’ not only for this country, but also 
for other WB candidate countries and Turkey, with no plausible response to the aspira-
tions of others like Ukraine, opens a new chapter in the history of European integration, 
with uncertain aftermaths (Sedelmeier 2011). Has Europe lost a historical opportunity to 
constitute the Union based on solidarity among its people, when the opening towards 
the post-communist countries became enlargement instead of (re)unification? (Supiot 
2010) 
Nevertheless, the real effects of the five-year moratorium on the process of accession 
of aspirant countries are still to be observed and explored. In conclusion, I return to the 
problem of tension between the consideration of a European society as a composition 
of the societies of its member-nations and, conditionally, of the applicant countries; as 
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a supranational society of the EU(6-28-?); and as a trans-national society of Europe. Be-
cause the discourse on democracy remains biased in a national framework, and because 
the definition of demos relative to a specific groupings is defined in cultural, social and 
political terms and circumscribed to the territorial context of a national state, thinking 
about the EU outside this perspective seems extremely difficult (Bellamy and Castiglione 
2013; Urbinati 2014). Consequently, thinking in terms of a European society as such 
seems to be a contradiction.  
One possible way to resolve this contradiction might be to reverse the approach by 
questioning the ability of a late modern national state to fulfil its essential conditions any 
longer: to achieve the ‘utopia’ of the congruency of the political and national body, de-
fined in cultural terms and territory (citizenship towards nationhood); to regulate na-
tional capitalist oligarchs and movements of capital and labour; to produce and preserve 
the nation’s cultural homogeneity; and to fulfil the promise of social justice through wel-
fare (Altvater et al. 2013; Blokker 2014). Moreover, there is a certain shift between the 
state and the nation, because the state seems to be ever more distant from the expec-
tations of its ‘people(s)’ or its ‘nation(s)’, and in some cases is considered to be a political 
enemy of the ethno-national community. As Show and Štiks argued, citizenship may 
prove to be a tool of fragmentation, dissolution and ethnic engineering, as happened in 
Yugoslavia’s successor states, with unpredictable social consequences. Anyhow, as Fer-
rera demonstrated, European integration has led indeed to a partial disjunction between 
social citizenship and national territory (Ferrera 2005; Bifulco 2015).   
 The European Union still has a chance to rediscover its own founding principles and 
move towards an ‘equalisation in progress’ of life and work conditions of its citizens (Su-
piot 2010). At the same time the EU still has a chance to fail, as the Greek crisis, or even 
more current refugee crises have been demonstrating, if its attitude would continue to 
be what an angry Habermas called  ‘a comic uniformly nation-state way of thinking’. No 
European society is possible without a political Europe in which citizens ‘must retain the 
final say in existential questions for Europe’ (Habermas 2015). 
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